1960s.
12 It is well known that high-ranking Argentine officers, including Generals Viola and Galtieri, were graduates of the School of the Americas (SOA). 13 However, the influence of the so-called French School on the Argentine military, developed prior to the SOA, was arguably deeper. 14 Qualifying the state terrorism in Argentina as ''genocide'' has always been problematic. 15 Some experts prefer the use of the concept of ''politicide,'' 16 while others insist on ''state terrorism.'' Yet, ever since Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón's first attempt to use the term ''genocide'' in his accusation against Argentine naval officer Adolfo Scilingo in 2005, which Spain's Supreme Court rejected, and later, in the 2006 sentencing of the against the police chief of Buenos Aires, Miguel Etchecolatz, who was accused of committing crimes against humanity in the context of genocide, 17 the concept made a breakthrough not only in Argentina but also in the general debate concerning the broadening of its meaning from the original limited definition.
18 Daniel Feierstein dedicated the third volume of his extended analysis of genocide as a social practice to focusing on the specific issue surrounding the use of the concept in a trial. 19 As he explained,
One of the most interesting parts of some of the trials was that the Tribunals decided to hear the testimonies of sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, philosophers, psychologists, and historians, so as to critically understand what is considered a national group in different disciplines and how the law sometimes uses concepts without a true appreciation of their meaning. Last but not least, during the process, we realized how this is clearly a more accurate and powerful way to revisit Lemkin's initial ideas, and understand how the only way to really challenge and confront genocidal thinking and its long after-effects, is a legal confrontation on the basis that that there are groups who are not part of our group (e.g., Armenians, Greeks or Assyrians who are not Turks, Jews who are not Germans or Poles, Tutsis who are not Rwandans, Bosnians who are not Yugoslavs, New People who are not Cambodians or Subversives who are not Argentines), and that the killings affects not only the directly persecuted but the whole national group (e.g. Turkey, Germany, Poland, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Cambodia or Argentina). They would not be the same communities without the annihilated peoples, so they have lost something which is part of themselves, and not something which is essentially different or alien from themselves, as the current understanding of genocide seems to suggest.
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This article uses the concept of ''genocide'' for the crimes of the 1976-1983 Argentine dictatorship, while also acknowledging that widespread repression and systematic use of state terrorism on behalf of the military was carried on within a counterinsurgency war framed and formulated in strictly Cold Word terms, as a struggle of so-called Western values against leftist insurgency. We argue that this approach, proper to an international history disciplinary perspective, allows us to better understand the role of the US during the genocidal counterinsurgency war and repression of el Proceso against the Argentine people. It evolved from the initial loose support of the Ford administration into what we call ''the Carter exception'' in 1977-79, when Washington denounced the violation of human rights and took concrete measures to put pressure on the Argentine military to end their campaign. By the end of 1979, however, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration ended the détente and its status as a defender of human rights was diminished and returned more to the Cold War practice of harsh rhetoric and an arms race. The Argentine military, meanwhile, had established contact with the Republican opposition that accused Carter of abandoning Washington's Latin American friends. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Argentine dictatorship recuperated US support when Ronald Reagan became President of the United States. Moreover, they became more involved in Central America where they trained and advised fellow military in their own counterinsurgency wars, which soon became part of the Reagan administration's rollback strategy against an ''overstretched'' Soviet Union-the ''Evil Empire.'' The Malvinas War and Argentina's defeat, however, would not only put an end to Washington's support for the Argentine dictatorship but also turn the page on US backing for military dictatorships in Latin America and mark the debut of ''democracy promotion. '' It is clear that US involvement in Argentina during the 1976-1983 dictatorship was reduced and much more indirect than, for example, in the Chilean case. Yet, considering the strategic framing of the junta's counterinsurgency strategy (the so-called National Security Doctrine) and the role the SOA played in the formation of the military involved in el Proceso, including those who assumed its leadership, the role of the US cannot be overlooked. 21 In fact, our main argument maintains that this role is better understood within: (a) the structural context of the Cold War in South America; (b) US-Argentine relations; and (c) the role of the military in Argentine politics. We, therefore, trace-back the formation of the Argentine military in counterinsurgency warfare to the initial French participation, and look at the contribution of the SOA. This analytical framing also helps us better understand the military's attempts at diversifying US-Argentine relations when on the one hand they denounced the Carter administration's ''anti-Argentine'' campaign and, on the other, maintained ties with the Pentagon and Republicans. Overall, the Argentine military, as other military in South America, enjoyed a good deal of autonomy from Washington when pursuing their its own interests and goals. In fact, it was so confident in its autonomy that it believed Washington would assume at least a neutral position during the Malvinas war.
To elaborate on our arguments we have divided this article into five sections. We start with a conceptual assessment of the Cold War in Latin America in general and South America in particular. In Section II we propose a brief historical perspective of US-Argentine relations since the end of the Second World War. Next, we focus on the special role the military played in Argentine politics since the 1930 coup, with an emphasis on the internal divisions in the 1960s between nationalist and pro-US factions. Section IV follows the logic of the military as the main holder of power in Argentina and discusses the inclusion of counterinsurgency warfare in its formation under, first, the influence of the French model and, next, the emergence of the National Security Doctrine and the input of the SOA. The fifth section elaborates on the main argument of this article about the evolution of the US position with respect to the 1976-1983 military dictatorship, from Kissinger's advice to the Carter exception, and the return of Cold War ''normality'' with the Reagan administration. This section also reveals the multilevel relations the Argentine military tried to establish with key players in Washington, as well as its involvement in Central America with the indirect support of the Pentagon. The conclusion highlights the main analytical lines of our arguments and proposes some general reflections.
Section I. The Cold War in the US' ''Backyard'' The Cold War is known as a global confrontation of two ideological worldviews under the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union, the two post-WWII super-powers. However, as Westad argues, it was not solely the strategic clash of these two superpowers that shaped the worldwide diffusion of the East/West paradigm of rivalry and conflict:
Third World elites often framed their own political agendas in conscious response to the models of development presented by the two main contenders of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union. In many cases the Third World leaders' choices of ideological allegiances brought them to subscribe to models of development that proved disastrous for their own peoples.
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Following this argument, during the Cold War, Latin America was not a battlefield for the Soviet-American rivalry to expand their influence as much as it was a ''killing zone'' where traditional US intervention changed to a doctrine of containment. According to Rabe, the ''Kennan corollary'' defined the rationale of US behavior as still being aimed at preventing the spread of communism, . . . which Kennan predicted would come not from external attack but through internal subversion. Rewriting the history of the Monroe Doctrine, Kennan believed the United States had the diplomatic tradition to demand the exclusion of Communists from the hemisphere. Not surprisingly, Kennan doubted whether Latin Americans had the societal resolve to resist the blandishments of the Communists. Kennan therefore concluded that ''harsh governmental measures of repression may be the only answer; that these measures may have to proceed from regimes whose origins and methods would not stand the test of American concepts of democratic procedure; and that such regimes and such methods may be preferable alternatives, to further communist successes.''
23
Hardly, however, was there any communist upsurge in Latin America when George F. Kennan-the well-known American diplomat was ''Mr. X'' in the 1947 Foreign Affairs article, ''The Sources of the Soviet Conduct''-wrote a ten thousand word report to the secretary of state after his 1950s tour to a region he confessed he barely knew. Rather, with external encouragement during the Second World War, between 1944 and 1946 a wave of democratization spread throughout the region. ''Authoritarian regimes tumbled across the hemisphere, and democratic leaders initiated agrarian and labor reforms, expanded political rights and unveiled social security programs. The degree of ambitiousness varied from country to country, but the general trend was unmistakable. '' 24 This wave of democratization improved the social and economic conditions of the lower and middle classes and empowered them; however it also raised the concerns of the conservative classes, traditional landowners, and power holders who reacted by supporting military coups, authoritarian governments, and widespread repression. Even if the US did not determine the ascendancy of the conservative classes and authoritarian regimes, [t] he emergence of the Cold War certainly heightened ideological polarization, debilitating the popular front and leading to a rash of anticommunist legislation in countries that had only recently been ruled by social democratic coalitions. US support for popular alliances cooled as well, and few of the military governments that came to power found it difficult to establish good relations with Washington.
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It is, then, within this analytical framing of, on the one hand, the US' ideological-driven spread of containment to Latin America, and, on the other, the concern of the conservative classes regarding the empowerment of the popular classes, for which they welcomed Washington's militant anti-communism, that the Cold War made a late arrival to the region. This analytical framing of the Peronist movement helps us understand the role that Latin American military played in diffusing the Cold War and using the paradigm in its own war against the popular classes. Thus, while the Cold War was ''pushed'' to Latin America, in the ''years following World War II,'' 26 the 1954 coup in Guatemala that overthrew the democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, with the active involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and authorized by Eisenhower's National Security Council (NSC) on 12 August 1953, became, as Rabe characterizes, ''the mother of interventions.'' 27 The 1962 Cuban missile crises, the only US-Soviet Cold War standoff episode in Latin America, strained Washington's relationship with the Latin American military even more. Already, in 1961, Washington had assigned the US Army's SOA the specific goal of teaching anti-Communist counterinsurgency training, which would lead to more CIA backed coups and dirty wars against subversive movements as planned in the National Security Doctrine.
Yet, this does not mean that the primary responsibility for military takeovers and repressions everywhere in Latin America rests on Washington. While it is true that the Cold War paradigm reached the continent with the US' grand strategy of containment, with the absence of a direct US-Soviet standoff in Latin America, it became a useful ideological framing for the local elite and military to pursue their own interests and power projects. In other words, Latin American elites and the military performed with rather broad autonomy. In fact, they had their own goals and were eager to pursue them independently of US strategic interests. This is especially the case for Brazil, despite its historically close relationship with the US and an ally during World War II; but also for Argentina, which, as the next section shows, maintained its distance from Washington and declared neutrality until the very end of the fall of Nazi Germany.
Section II. Argentina's (Historically) Problematic Relationship with Washington According to Roberto Russell, since its consolidation as a nation-state by the end of the nineteenth century, Argentina's foreign policy went through three major cycles. During the first of these cycles , the ruling elite reached a wide consensus with respect to Argentina's position in world politics, which consisted in ''affiliation to the European sphere, opposition to the United States . . . relative isolation from Latin America and the defense of peace as a presupposition of peace.'' 28 With the encouragement of Great Britain, Argentina rejected a US proposal to form a continental customs union during the First All American (Pan-American) Conference in 1889-90 in Washington, and stopped the latter's ambition to gradually displace London and reach a position of primacy in the continent. Despite that, after 1916, Argentina imported more manufactured goods from the US, though the British market continued to be the main recipient of Argentine products. With the world economy entering the era of the Depression, in Argentina the military came into power and the state's intervention in the economy increased. With the 1946 election of charismatic military leader Lieutenant Juan Domingo Perón, the new and longest cycle of Argentina's foreign policy reflected the inward development model known as import substitution industrialization (ISI). Despite the end of World War II, and based on Perón's conviction about the inevitability of the next one, Argentina rejected the US-promoted multilateralism to concentrate on strengthening the internal market and protecting it from external shocks, while simultaneously bringing relations with Latin America back to the foreign policy's agenda within the framework of a ''closed regionalism'' development model. Thus, Argentina's membership to international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was deliberately delayed until the second half of the 1960s.
The search and preservation of national autonomy also determined the country's approach to the East-West conflict. Perón's Third Position and the ''independent'' policies of the following governments, aimed at distancing Argentina from both camps and building a world order that would give more opportunities to countries that would later be known as the ''South.'' This policy generated close relations with the positions of non-alignment and neutrality that blossomed in the developing world from the mid1950s. Argentina never kept an equidistant position between Washington and Moscow; however neither did it jump on the bandwagon with the US. The non-equidistant position meant that Argentina would not be neutral in case of rising tensions between the two superpowers. Refusing to bandwagon with Washington meant that it would not automatically assume any position that US interests dictated. Little had remained of the old rivalry and systematic discrepancies based on the need to maintain economic links with Europe; now Argentina needed to fix the differences of its own interests with respect to broader power asymmetries, as well as distinguish between West's strategic conveniences and global politics and US national interests.
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Thus, it is the rationale of the economic development models during both the 1880-1930 and 1946-1983 foreign policy cycles that was the main explanatory factor of Argentina's problematic relationship with the US; not, as some analysts maintain, a so-called ''political culture'' inherited from the Catholicism of the Spanish Empire, which is fundamentally anti-liberal and sympathetic to authoritarianism. 30 In fact, the model was essentially liberal when Argentina emerged as a rapidly developing country by the end of the nineteenth century and was recognized as one of the richest countries in the world when it celebrated the Centennial of the Revolution in 1910. The Argentine oligarchy, the ruling elite of the so-called Conservative Order at that time, privileged its relations with Europe and Great Britain beyond any other consideration. Likewise, when the global center-periphery trade system of the nineteenth century entered into crisis and collapsed in 1929, the inward development model of ISI proved to be a success for the country in avoiding the painful economic depression that most of Europe and the US suffered.
This is important to understand, because even if Fascist and Nazi sympathies existed in the country in the 1930s and during World War II, Argentina's neutrality during the war is linked to ISI. Moreover, Perón's political doctrine and his rise as a popular leader after the war was based primarily on the success of ISI in a historical context, when the US tried to build the post-war order and consolidate its hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Although for the US Argentina was already ''the black sheep of the hemispheric community'' 31 because of its neutrality during the war, it was the open, and unwise, campaign of the US ambassador, Spruille Braden, who arrived in Buenos Aires on 19 May 1945, against de facto President Edelmiro Julián Farrell and the rising political star of that time, Juan Domingo Perón, that backlashed and deeply marked the US-Argentine post-WWII split. For Argentine voters, ''Braden o Perón,'' Perón's 1946 electoral campaign slogan, ''identified the General as the candidate who was opposing the US denomination and promising to promote Argentina in world politics.'' 32 Since then it has remained an icon of Argentines' reluctance to foreign, especially US, intervention in internal affairs. The Braden-Perón episode became a benchmark for analysts to identify Argentina's anti-Americanism with the emergence and persistence of the Perónist movement. This, at least, is an exaggeration and historically inaccurate. This section argues that the development models Argentina adopted explain its push for autonomy in foreign relations and, therefore, its everlasting suspicion of the US' hegemonic drive. This is a crucial explanatory variable. For example, after Perón's destitution from a coup in 1955, the military's growing recognition that their national security needed a closer alliance with the US led to the ratification of the Organization of American States' Charter, the inclusion of Argentina in US-created international institutions, such as the IMF, and the Eisenhower administration's direct financial support for the new government. 33 In spite of this, the country's elite remained eager to keep to proper criteria when deciding on foreign relations, even when it irritated Washington. Such is the case of Arturo Frondizi's government's decision not to break Argentina's relations with Cuba until February 1962, in order to counterbalance its opening to the US, and, even in spite of that, after a month the military displaced him with a coup before the end of his Constitutional mandate.
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From that moment on, the US' main focus would be on counterinsurgency, which, in turn, provided the Argentine military with a framework from which to expand the so called National Security Doctrine and justify its permanence in power at the cost of democracy and civilian rule. The next section highlights the role of the military in Argentine politics from a historical perspective. This will allow us to rationalize the importance of US-promoted counterinsurgency in repression, the violation of human rights, state terrorism, and genocide. Of course, military intervention in domestic politics was not new in Argentina. Even during the first Yrigoyen presidency, they intervened to brutally repress worker strikes in Buenos Aires (1919) and the Patagonia (1921).
Military intervention was encouraged by the specter of subversion after World War I. In Argentina fears of communism were heightened by the presence of an urban working class consisting primarily of foreigners. . . . A highly politicized and militant labor movement emerged during and after World War I, supposedly encouraged by the demagogy of the populist party in power. Populism provided an excuse for subversion, according to Conservatives, with the implication that the democracy of the polls was illegitimate. It also provided an excuse for military coups aimed at repressing the conditions of subversion in populist demagogy. 36 However, it is important to remember that in 1930 the Supreme Court, turning to Roman Law, ruled that the armed forces may legitimately displace an elected government because they are tasked with protecting life, liberty, and property. From that moment, the legalization of the 1930 coup institutionalized military rule. Also, the ''idea of a coup was first implanted by civilians, who approached retired general José Félix Uriburu in 1927 in the hope of preventing Yrigoyen from being reelected.'' 37 In fact, civilian support for coups and dictatorships became crucial for the self-legitimation of the military when justifying repression.
The institutionalization of the Argentine military's intervention in domestic politics is one of the most widely studies topics. Among others, Robert A. Potash, 38 Alain Rouquié, 39 and David Pion-Berlin 40 have all written extensively about the rise and evolution of the Argentine military, its involvement in politics, and its relations with civilians. According to Potash, a series of reforms at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, driven mostly by the fear of a war with Chile, deeply modified the military organization. These reforms included: the creation of the Higher School of War in 1900; the military draft in 1901, also known as Ricchieri's Act and named for Pablo Ricchieri who was the minister of war at that time; its reform in 1905 to include the Navy; and the professionalization of career promotions. ''One of the most significant aspects of the importance of the professionalization after 1900 has been the diffusion of the German military influence through advisors, training programs in Germany and armaments.'' 41 Argentina had signed several contracts with German companies in the 1890s for the acquisition of arms and equipment. Moreover, in 1899, German officers were invited to organize the War Academia, leading in the following year to the adoption of the Prussian model in the organization of different institutions, such as the Shooting School and the Military Geographic Institute. ''The influence of the German military concepts within the Argentine officer corps deepened further with the constant practice of sending selected officers for additional training to Germany.'' 42 Among these officers was José Félix Uriburu, who was a firm supporter of Argentina's neutrality during World War I; as such, though not the main cause, German influence in the earlier stages of forming military institutions explains, at least in part, Argentina's neutrality during both World Wars in the twentieth century. It is also related to the rise of nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s, as a reaction to liberalism during a historical moment when the economic development model, based on free trade, enters into crisis. As David Rock has written, nationalist ideas in the 1930s penetrated the army. ''They also developed their own critical philosophy to liberalism adopting a militant anti-imperialism that deeply questioned the relations of the oligarchy with Great Britain, the main investor and buyer of Argentine products.'' 43 Thus, Argentine anti-liberal nationalism, which was very popular among the military, initially was not anti-American as much as it was anti-British. It nevertheless had an impact on relations with the US after the rise of the latter as the liberal superpower, replacing Great Britain after World War II. However, with the expansion of containment across South America and after the fall of Perón, the military's position toward the US changed. Not precisely because the military became liberal, rather, the Cold War and US assistance provided it with the ideological argument, political support, and know-how to remain in power.
The foreign policy of the Revolución Libertadora, the name the military gave to the 1955 coup that interrupted Perón's second mandate, adhered to US positions on the international stage. 44 After the brief interlude of Kennedy's Alliance for Progress and engagement with democracy, the US turned to counterinsurgency as the main guideline of its policies in Latin America. Counterinsurgency was the US' reaction to Khrushchev's reach into the Third World and Castro's ambition to expand the Cuban revolution in the region. Counterinsurgency implied the participation not only of the Pentagon, but also the CIA, FBI, and USAID's public security program. 45 In Argentina, public opinion and the political elite continued to strongly favor national sovereignty. So did the military, though as early as 1956 some high-ranking officers started to ask for a ''democratization'' of the armed forces and criticized the dominant Prussian tradition. Meanwhile, the Pentagon started sending pedagogical material to Argentine military schools and invited an entire class of graduates from the military college to take a course in the US. 46 From 1960, ''the communist danger'' became a dominant topic in the Argentine conservative press, and, seldom, synonymous to anti-Peronism. The military shared this common ground; however, soon an internal division separated the ultraliberals from the nationalists. In 1962, tension between the two factions reached its highest level bringing the country to the edge of civil war. Within this division, the faction that became known as the Reds (colorados) identified Peronism with a sectarian and violent class movement that leads to communism. For the Blues (azules), on the other hand, despite its errors, excesses, power abuses, and demagogy, ''Peronism is a national and Christian force that saved the working class from communism and, therefore, was a pillar against subversion.'' 47 They opposed Perón from a professional perspective considering that he politicized the armed forces; otherwise, they were deeply anti-liberal and nationalist. In fact, their leader, General Juan Carlos Onganía, the head of Argentine Revolution (Revolución Argentina) that ended the presidency of Arturo Ilía in 1966, called for Argentine-Brazilian cooperation to fight communism in the Western Hemisphere.
At the beginning of the Onganía regime, anti-communism and the National Security Doctrine had become a double-edged sword for Argentina's foreign and domestic politics. Superficially it defended the need to maintain close cooperation with the US, however it received broad support from anti-Democratic and nationalist military and civilian sectors that were openly hostile to the United States. 48 It is clear that when counterinsurgency became the leading paradigm of US policy in Latin America, the Argentine military adopted it to perpetuate its power. The next section looks at the role counterinsurgency played in the formation of the military from its earlier French model to that of the SOA.
Section IV: The Evolution of Counterinsurgency to a National Security Doctrine: From the French Model to the School of the Americas Though counterinsurgency as a warfare strategy goes back to the nineteenth century, the twentieth century version is a ''made in France'' product. It is the French colonial experience in Indochina and Algeria 49 that established the conceptual and practical bases of the strategy the US applied to Latin America, Vietnam, Central America, Afghanistan, and Iraq from the 1960s to present day. The Argentine military was among the first to study the French experience with the assistance of officers directly involved in operations in Indochina and Algeria. The counterinsurgency strategy that the French invented and experimented with in Algiers, 50 I would say that the National Reorganization Process that the military government implemented in March 1976 is a copy of the battle for Algiers. The only difference is that you intervened in a colony whereas we did it in our own country. This exception aside, we learned everything from the French: the division of the territory, the importance of intelligence in this sort of warfare, the methods of interrogation.
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Like the other members of the junta, Bignone shows no remorse at all for using torture.
We won the military battle, but we lost the political one, just like the French in Algeria! Our biggest mistake was accepting the term ''dirty war,'' because no war is clean: innocent people die in every war. And it is my conviction that the National Reorganization Process provoked less death than any classic war.
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The French model's foundational influence notwithstanding, counterinsurgency as a strategy of containment in Latin America essentially mirrored the way the US fought the Cold War in the region, namely by relying on the local military as allies to whom Washington provided the ideological, theoretical, and practical support to help efforts to elaborate the National Security Doctrine and then implement it. Counterinsurgency was also the conceptual framing for the violent repression that the Latin American military used against their own people, with the support of local oligarchies, a process through which the military became the main agents of the ''Latin Americanization'' 53 of the global conflict and the diffusion of the Cold War paradigm in the region. This was done through a series of programmatic principles labeled as a National Security Doctrine that justified counterinsurgency as a strategy of containment against communism.
The National Security Doctrine marked a fundamental change in the role of Latin American armed forces. Their mission was no longer to secure the borders but to look for and try to identify the enemy within country. Despite armed organizations (generically labelled ''guerilla'' or ''armed subversion'' by the military) primarily defining the internal enemy, the repression targeted a broad arc of political opponents: communist, socialist, anti-imperialist militants, peasant and labor unions, student movements, church communities linked to the Liberation Theology, as well as any group of nationalist ideology that would presumably threaten ''national security.'' In what follows, we try to put into context this argument about US ''guilt,'' focusing on Washington's policy during el Proceso.
Section V: The US and the Genocide in Argentina Perhaps the most remarkable success of American-led training for counterinsurgency and the role the SOA played in creating a common mindset among Latin American military was Operation Cóndor, a broad plan of cooperation among the dictatorships to share intelligence in locating and eliminating political opponents. Cóndor meant ''the 'continentalization' of political criminality,'' according to Chilean writer and politician Volodia Teitelboim. 57 Arguably, the secret plan was first revealed in the aftermath of 63 Yet, this happened when the US was preparing a détente with the Soviet Union, and, according to Mark Atwood Lawrence, ''Latin America ranked at the bottom of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's global priorities.'' 64 The insignificance of Latin America in international politics and history in general, led to a policy aimed at the low-key preservation of the status quo by relying on friendly dictators. This basically meant abstaining from any interference in the way Latin American rulers, mainly from the military, assured the maintenance of the status quo. However, on the one hand this lack of will to interfere in domestic affairs gave greater autonomy to the Latin American military and, therefore, alienated the region from the US when Jimmy Carter made respect for human rights a pillar of his foreign policy. On the other hand, it created confusion with respect to the US' role in the widespread repression of the military government's own people. First, the supposed unimportance of Latin America during the Nixon administration, and therefore the lack of intervention, also meant the continuity of the counterinsurgency approach and its implications for the training and support of the military. Second, given the US agencies involved in the specific programs of training and support, direct contact between provider and customer continued. Third, the Nixon administration's ''low profile'' in Latin America is highly questionable. This is due to several factors: first, Nixon's interest in forging a special relationship with the Brazilian dictatorship 65 and Kissinger's attempt to make Brazil a US ''policeman'' in the region much the same way Iran has become in the Middle East; 66 second, and most importantly, its role in first undermining the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile, then giving active support to Pinochet's coup on 11 September 1973.
67 Therefore, it is not surprising that while the two superpowers enjoyed a détente in their relationship, allowing a European opening to their Eastern neighbors and a German Ostpolitik, Latin America went through the most violent period of the Cold War. The US' predominant counterinsurgency approach to Latin America during the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s succeeded in installing the Cold War in the region, leading high-ranking officers to think and declare that ''the Southern Cone had become the central front of a 'Third World War' between communism and the West.''
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El Proceso and the genocidal repression in Argentina are part of this ''Third World War'' that the military ''fought'' against its own people, convinced that it was assuming its share of responsibility in the global contingency of the Cold War. Arguably, it expected Washington's support, or at least understanding, as was the case for other military coups in neighboring countries; and they probably did not expect a serious demand for human rights, as would be the case with the Carter administration. Yet, while Operation Cóndor was going on in South America, Carter's secretary for human rights, Derian, and Tex Harris, the US diplomat in charge of nuclear affairs in the embassy who assumed an active role in the defense of human rights, pressured the junta to allow a fact-finding visit from the Organization of American States' InterAmerican Commission for Human Rights. Of course, not everyone in the Carter administration approved this change in US policy toward its Latin American ''friends.'' The Argentine military found sympathizers and allies, such as secretary for Latin American affairs, Terence Todman, who later in the 1990s became the US ambassador in Buenos Aires, as well as those Republican politicians in Washington who never shared Carter's enthusiasm for human rights-at least, not at a price as high as the alienation of the Latin American military. With Carter still in the White House at the end of 1979, when the Cold War made a comeback after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and American reaction was to end arms control negotiations and return to massive military building, the Argentine military thought it had resisted well and won. By then, it was already engaged in the Central American conflict and advising colleagues in Honduras and El Salvador. Its hope for unconditional US backing with the election of Ronald Reagan was so high that it did not hesitate to declare war on the United Kingdom for the reclamation of the Malvinas islands.
In what follows, we analyze the US policy toward el Proceso in three periods: (1) the end of the Ford administration; (2) the two years of the Carter exception; and (3) the return of the Cold War and Reagan's first year until the Malvinas war in 1982. We mostly focus on primary sources, declassified US documents 69 from the years of the repression, but also use secondary sources in an effort to explain Washington's policy and its evolution, as well as dissents from the official position within the US' successive administrations from 1976 to 1982. We aim at making a case for our main argument, that the US played a role in Argentina's genocidal repression by providing the ideological framework and know-how for the counterinsurgency's coercion that it had built up in the previous two decades, 70 and in turn not being able to deter the Argentine military from reaching unprecedented levels of atrocity in its criminal enterprise.
Section V(a): Ambassador Hill's Initial Support and Quick Deception: The Last Days of the Ford Administration (1976)
The US embassy in Buenos Aires knew about the military takeover of 24 March 1976 before it happened. On 13 February, Diego Medus, head of the North American desk at Argentina's Foreign Ministry, informed the US embassy that the military had requested a report about how a future military government could avoid human rights problems with the US. He also made it clear that the military intended to engage in illegal violence while waging an all-out war against ''terrorists. ' ' 71 Yet, Robert Hill, the US ambassador to Argentina, who already considered the military the only hope for restoring stability, found it encouraging that Argentine officers would seek a way to avoid frustrations with Washington over human rights problems and supported their political aspiration. In a telegram to the assistant secretary of state on 16 March 1976, Hill told of his conversation with Admiral Massera on the same day and commented: Admiral Massera was very correct throughout the conversation. He scrupulously placed all his comments in the conditional tense, and several time emphasized that he was speaking hypothetical possibilities. Nonetheless, Pol Couns and I had the distinct impression that Massera was talking about a coup which will probably come within the next few days, possibly before the weekend.
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The imminence of a coup, along with the conviction that Argentines will support it, is asserted in an embassy telegram two days before the takeover. 73 Hill was all too confident that the Argentine military had changed and were more democratically minded than a decade ago; moreover, he was convinced about Videla's ''moderate line,'' 74 and almost a month after the coup he maintained that the junta had nothing to do with violations of human rights:
Our political sources, plus US newsmen here (who are very sensitive to human rights issues) continue to express surprise that Junta had acted with as much moderation as it has so far, given the atmosphere of left-right terrorism which the country has endured for the last three years. Its policy is to respect human rights.
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''In fact, the Argentine military had changed in the ten years since the Onganía coup, though not in a moderate direction.'' 76 At its final stage in 1975, the Argentine military's National Security Doctrine asserted that the country was at the brink of a world war against communism. ''War'' was not a metaphor; it meant counterinsurgency and, therefore, was synonymous with the repression the military carried on.
[L]ess than two months after the Argentine military coup on March 24, 1976, Hill was beginning to have serious doubts regarding the validity of the military junta's selfproclaimed ''moderate line.'' Although the ambassador, along with most Argentines, continued to view Videla as a moderate, Hill was disturbed by reports of the three armed service branches operating independently of each other and engaging in widespread arbitrary arrests.
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A telegram from the US embassy on 11 May 1976 started to cast doubt on the military's ''moderation,'' concluding:
Whatever his motives, fact is that Videla has not come to grips with situations and stopped drift toward harder line. In embassy's judgement, unless he or someone else does, Junta will soon face serious difficulties both at home and abroad-abroad, because hardliners will give little attention to human rights and will create same sort of situation faced by Chilean Junta; at home, because hardliners will alienate major sectors and create conditions under which leftist/extremists will pick.
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By the end of May, Hill had already become strongly critical of the junta and personally warned foreign minister Cesar Guzzeti that US-Argentine relations would suffer gravely if the government did not improve its human rights record. Yet, his attempts to pressure the Argentine military were neutralized by the secretary of states' approach to US-Argentine relations; Kissinger cancelled seven visits that Hill organized, convinced that high-level US pressure could play a role in curbing the Argentine dirty war. Finally, Kissinger met Guzzeti in Santiago de Chile to, as previously mentioned, assure him that ''we would like you to succeed,'' however, also advising that ''if there are things to be done, you should do them quickly.'' 79 This was enough for the junta to conclude that there was no real problem with the US and that its criminal enterprise could go on without any serious foreign consequences. Later, Hill detailed his lonely efforts to protect human rights in Argentina to the assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs Patricia Derian on her first trip to Buenos Aires following Jimmy Carter's electoral victory over Gerald Ford. ''Kissinger gave the Argentines the green light,'' the ambassador bluntly concluded.
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Section V(b): The Carter Exception (1977) (1978) (1979) . No Latin American dictatorship expected a US administration to take the issue of human rights seriously enough to put pressure on loyal allies in the battle against communism-certainly not the Argentine junta after receiving Kissinger's support, despite also warning about a change following Democrat electoral success. Yet, the Carter administration's first two years, at least, had been an exception in US policy toward Latin America. The 39th president of the United States applied a series of amendments to the 1961 Foreign Aid Bill that Congress had legislated from 1973 to 1976 following the Vietnam War to implement sanctions to human rights violations, including limiting and eventually stopping economic and military assistance. If the congressional action was aimed at imposing further control on the executive branch, it also gave activists an opportunity to push the human rights agenda further. Carter recognized that human rights had become a major political issue and embraced it to appeal to both liberal internationalists and cold warriors; while the former aimed at seriously improving the worldwide condition of human rights, the latter saw it as a means of pressuring the communist world. Amidst the détente and arms control negotiations going on with the Soviet Union, the Carter administration's policy on human rights encouraged dissidents in Communist countries and provided serious support to activists in Latin America. This was particularly true for Argentina, where Derian arrived three days after the first anniversary of the coup and left no doubt about the uncompromising character of the new administration's demand for the respect of human rights. Derian's intransigence surprised officials in both the Argentine government and the US embassy, where not everyone shared Ambassador Hill's change of heart with respect to the military. Derian also met with representatives of human rights advocates and the relatives of victims of state terrorism for a ''glimpse into the terror of the Argentine dirty war.'' 81 For the next two years, Argentina became a main target of US pressures aimed at improving human rights while ''avoiding the fall of Videla's regime.'' 82 Indeed, Carter's policy did not aim for regime change, nor did it insist on democracy promotion, which would become central to Reagan's policy toward Latin America after the Malvinas war. Upon his arrival to the US embassy in the fall of 1977, Harris decided to open the doors for two hours every day to receive those who came to report disappearances, and prepared 9,500 individual files to send to the assistant secretary for human rights in Washington. Despite all the threats he and his family received, including a kidnapping attempt, Harris saved lives, gave a voice to the victims of the repression, and succeeded in blocking a loan from Eximbank to the Argentine Navy unless the government first accepted a visit from a delegation from the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights. In an extended interview that Harris gave 36 years after the military takeover during his visit to Argentina, Harris revealed further details about his mission and the obstacles he faced in the embassy and the State Department. Praising the peaceful resistance that the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo started against the dictatorship, Harris considers that this was the event that broke Kissinger's antiCommunist strategy. ''Argentina has been the case that showed the world what not to do in the struggle against terrorism.'' 83 Nevertheless, his reports started to have a practical impact on US-Argentine relations, when, for the first time, Washington denied sending helmets that the Argentine navy requested. Harris faced serious discontent from the new US ambassador: ''Ambassador Raúl Castro felt that my reports were impeding his control on US policy towards Argentina. He was a close friend of Roberto Viola and tried to help him in the internal struggle of the junta, but Washington had no interest in this little war.'' 84 Moreover, while he continued sending his reports to Derian, US firms continued secretly negotiating with the dictatorship; yet, as mentioned, because of Harris' efforts, a major deal between the US and the Argentine navy involving Eximbank failed because the bank had to cancel the loan.
This was a very important project for the US business community; the Trade Department and Treasury were furious because they considered Carter's human rights policy the equivalent of a drop in exports and US jobs. Meanwhile, in Argentina the navy was mad because its future ''cash cow'' was in limbo because the US government decided not to extend its insurance for the Eximbank loan. Not everyone shared Carter's shift prioritizing human rights over the Cold War paradigm for US policy in Argentina-not the Pentagon, the Republican opposition, or even people within his own administration, the so-called hawks or career diplomats. Harris became a pariah within the staff of the US Embassy where he was considered someone who was not a team player. The main person displeased with Harris' engagement and persistence was Ambassador Castro, who was not only disgusted with Harris' direct reporting to Derian but also advocated a different approach to the dictatorship by insisting on differentiating between the hardliners and the moderates. 86 His prudence was shared within the State Department, where in 1977 Carter named Terence Todman head of the Latin American area. Todman tried to limit the ''harm'' that the reports of human rights violations were causing to Latin American military governments, including the Argentine junta. ''Todman wanted, at maximum, a discrete pressure from Washington. According to him, it was necessary to avoid the alienation of those states and military aligned with the US in the region.'' 87 Ultimately Harris was marginalized in the Foreign Service, punished for six years, and was on a list of diplomats on the verge of dismissal because of his ''lack of discipline'' when, finally, in 1984 he received the Rivkin Award for his role in Argentina and an interview with Bill Moyers received strong public recognition and support thereby saving his career. On the other hand, Todman continued his career, becoming US ambassador to Argentina in 1989 and one of the leading figures in the drastic shift in Argentina's foreign policy towards a closer alignment with Washington during the Menem government. Yet, the main blow to Harris, Derian, and the human rights community in the US came with Carter's decision in 1978 to promote both human rights and economic liberalization by limiting the use of economic sanctions as a diplomatic tool to pressure the military. Critics of his policy of human rights promotion already existed in Congress where Argentina was a defining test. With Reagan, US policy toward Latin America returned to its normal course. Military governments were once again considered less dangerous than communist authoritarian regimes-allies and not pariahs according to Jeane Kirkpatrick. 90 The new administration restored the status of ''ally'' to the Argentine military and incorporated it into its anti-Communist crusade in Central America. In turn, the Argentine military perceived the renewed US support as a reward for its engagement in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, where it was already training its peers in counter-subversive techniques. In other words, the Argentine military was already exporting its know-how from Bolivia to Central America and waiting for a normalization of US policy after the Carter administration's brief ''exception.'' 91 The encouragement and support that the Argentine military received from the Reagan administration created the illusion that the White House would at least remain neutral during the Malvinas war, if not support Argentina's claim. Reagan not only sided with the UK, but the Malvinas adventure of the Argentine military ended Washington's confidence in Latin American dictatorships. Immediately after the end of the Malvinas war, Reagan installed a policy of ''democracy promotion'' in Latin America, sending a strong signal of the end of US support for dictatorships. In Argentina, the failure in Malvinas, the disastrous experience of Martínez de Hoz economic liberalization, and the persistence of the civil mobilization against the military led to a unique transition to democracy in the whole region. Not only was the Argentine military refused participation in the transition process, but also, right after the CONADEP report, the Alfonsín government forced the junta to face a court, which in a historic decision in 1985 condemned it for widespread human rights violations.
Conclusion: The Lessons of Nunca Má s
El Proceso is arguably the worst period in Argentina's history, when institutionalized violence reached a genocidal level. As this article has asserted, there is no evidence of direct US involvement in the preparation and execution of the 24 March 1976 military takeover and subsequent dirty war. Argentina was not Iran, Guatemala, or even Chile, to name few of the countries where the US became directly involved in the overthrow of a constitutional government. Yet, it is a fact that the Argentine military perceived having the support of the Ford administration and, though it faced a couple of ''difficult'' years with Carter's human rights policy, it managed to ignore the pressure and continued its counter-subversive campaign. The impact of these short two years, thanks to the personal engagement of Derian and Harris, among others, cannot be underestimated; it opened practically the only door human rights organizations had to let the world know about the massive violation of human rights and give names to those whom Vidella cynically characterized as desaparecidos (the disappeared).
Nevertheless, there was no overwhelming consensus in the US to carry on the human rights campaign to its ultimate end. The US embassy's staff in Buenos Aires was displeased with Harris' ''lack of discipline''; his boss, Ambassador Castro, preferred a nuanced approach of distinguishing the ''moderate'' Vidella from hardliners. In the State Department, Todman disapproved of the pressure. In Congress, Carter faced strong opposition from conservatives who warned of the alienation his policies would created with ''friends,'' whereas liberals complained that he did not do enough. More importantly, the business community was absolutely critical because of the loss of opportunities in doing business with Argentina, as Congress considered legal leverages against aid, loans, and investments as tools for pressure. Carter's main mistake was to believe that there was no contradiction between promoting economic liberalization and human rights, convinced that ultimately the latter would create norms in the free market. Clearly this was not the case, and faced with increasing challenges from Iran to Nicaragua and Afghanistan, Carter finally stepped back in insisting too much on human rights. With Reagan, the Argentine military became so confident about its righteousness in fighting this ''Third World War'' and so deserving of a reward for its involvement in Central America that, before Washington's support of the Nicaraguan Contras to fight the Sandinistas and the military governments in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador to fight the revolutionaries, it declared war against Washington's closest ally in Malvinas with the sole aim of simply perpetuating power. The US support for el Proceso overall, therefore, was indirect.
Nevertheless, one cannot ignore that the Argentine military acted in the context of the Cold War. It implemented its counterinsurgency strategy as Latin America's version of containment, as promoted in the infamous SOA where it completed its formation and refined the lessons learned previously from the French School. This lends to the global context wherein el Proceso claimed legitimacy and acted according to the principles of its self-assigned ''mission'' and its importance when thinking about responsibility in genocide, no matter if, in fact, the context was merely justifying a dirty war fought primarily for domestic concerns. Indeed, from an international history perspective, context is one of the main explanatory factors for events and phenomena with domestic-international or local-global linkages. This is the case of the Cold War as the leading paradigm of US foreign policy in the aftermath of the Second World War and the struggle for power with the Soviet Union. As maintained in the beginning of this article, from a strategic perspective Latin America did not matter as much as Europe or Asia to the Soviet Union, which only became involved in a standoff situation with the US during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Moscow usually had a pragmatic approach toward geopolitically complicated regions, and prioritized trade and economic interests. Washington, however, had a historical relationship with Latin America going back as early as the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, and conflictive dynamics since 1898 in terms of hegemonic pushes and popular resistance.
Argentina has been among those countries that historically rejected the US' drive for hegemony and advocated for the principle of non-intervention; furthermore, its trade and development interests imposed a logic of distance and neutrality for US global initiatives, including international conflict in the twentieth century. The strategy of containment and its Latin American version of counterinsurgency, for the first time in history provided an ideological argument that helped, if not to close the gap, at least to build bridges between Washington and the powerful elite in Argentina, namely the military. As in most other Latin American countries, the Argentine military imported the Cold War and reframed it as a ''Third World War'' fought predominantly against a domestic enemy-its own people. As we have pointed out, with the Carter exception, Washington was generally supportive of the military, even forcing a fictional distinction between the ''moderates'' and ''hardliners.'' In other words, there was very little concern in Washington about the abuse of an ideological argument to legitimize a global struggle, supposedly for freedom from authoritarian repression.
Where does this leave us? Are there any lessons to be learned from the US' policy towards Latin America when military dictatorships violated human rights and, in the Argentine case, reached a genocidal dimension with massive repression framed as a ''Third World War''? Any rationalization of lessons learned from the past needs to consider the historical context, in this case the Cold War. Regardless of the practical aspects, containment as the US' grand strategy relied on a strong ideological foundation, which provided a dimension of being a self-assigned mission, as opposed to the narrow ''national interest'' rationale of foreign policy. Even if, from a US perspective, this dimension was deemed necessary or inevitable, considering the historical process of the US' emergence as a world power, adopting and reframing this ideology-and, in the same vein, Washington's tolerance (if not encouragement) to let it happenhas been one of the major pillars of the so-called National Security Doctrine in Latin America and its Argentine version, el Proceso. In Argentina, Nunca Más meant a widespread awareness to deny any role of the military in domestic affairs; it should also include awareness against using the ideological framework of a self-assigned mission as the legitimizing foundation of international or domestic ''intermestic'' engagement.
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